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1. Introduction 
 Imagine that you turn down a 50-50 gamble of losing $10 or gaining $11, 
and you happen to be an expected utility maximizer.  Then you will find yourself 
(absurdly) turning down any 50-50 gamble where you may lose $100, no matter 
how large the amount you stand to win.  This was Rabin’s (2000) paradox, which 
demonstrated how an innocuous preference has a surprising implication that 
strongly challenges the empirical validity of expected utility.  
 Rabin's paradox, abbreviated RP henceforth, is a thought experiment 
designed for the purpose of thinking through the consequences of expected utility 
theory.  It demonstrates that these consequences are absurd.  On one level, RP 
shows a problem with the logic of expected utility theory.  Yet, on another more 
important level, the paradox reflects a peculiarity of human behavior—the way 
that people are both risk averse “in the small” and “in the large.”  The question of 
why people behave this way has not been definitively answered.  While Rabin's 
thought experiment is useful, it must be distinguished from a real experiment, 
which is the only way to discover a plausible answer as to why it is people 
behave the way they do empirtically.  Such an answer is of fundamental 
importance to economics as a science that makes predictions about human 
behavior.  Therefore in this paper, we do not treat Rabin's seeming contradiction 
as a technical problem, but rather as a psychological one to be solved empirically. 
 Rabin’s thought-provoking paradox at first led to theoretical discussions 
about whether it truly violates expected utility and, if so, what might explain this 
violation.  Rabin suggested that his paradox may provide an argument not only 
against expected utility but, more generally, against reference independence and 
thus against all traditional decision models.  Several authors (referenced later) 
tried to rescue reference independence by suggesting other theoretical 
explanations, such as probability weighting, disappointment aversion, 
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background risks, or utility of income.  The main purpose of our paper is to 
resolve RP empirically.  We show that his suggestion is right, and reference 
dependence explains his paradox.  Other deviations from expected utility, while 
useful in many contexts, do not contribute empirically to explaining RP. 
 The theoretical debate of RP was complicated by differences in terminology: 
(a) Rubinstein (2006) suggested that the term “expected utility” incorporate 
reference dependence;
1
 (b) utility of income was an alternative term for reference 
dependence (see Figure 1).  Wakker (2010 pp. 244-245) reviewed early debates.  
Our §VII gives recent references and further details.  The abundance of 
theoretical debates and semantic confusions have been barriers to the resolution 
of RP.  Now, 17 years after its appearance, RP has turned into a classic and its 
meaning should be settled, theoretically and empirically.  We will introduce a 
theoretical model that can disentangle the various potential causes of RP, and 
then the experimental stimuli that allow to identify the real cause. 
 Cox et al. (2013), Csvd hereafter, were the first to provide empirical 
evidence of the assumed preference patterns in RP.  They also provided 
theoretical results showing exactly when Rabin’s calibration paradox refutes 
various reference-independent theories, including expected utility.  Thus, they 
were the first to conclusively show that RP is a genuine violation of expected 
utility.  However, they did not identify the causes of RP.  Our study does so. 
 Rabin (2000) already showed that utility curvature cannot completely 
explain RP.  We show that utility curvature does not play any empirical role at 
                                               
1 This was stated most clearly in his footnote 5.  Rubinstein took expected utility as an 
abstract mathematical theory without any empirical commitment, rather than as an 
economic theory about (rational) human decisions with financial or other traditional 
outcomes.  Thus, he proposed to use the term expected utility even for the irrational case 
of reference-dependent outcomes. 
 4 
all.  Several authors showed that other deviations from expected utility, primarily 
probability weighting may explain RP theoretically, although these deviations 
have their own problems.
2
  Csvd’s data did not provide conclusive evidence on 
probability weighting, and their formal and empirical analyses (of the traditional 
RP) did not involve reference dependence.  We show that probability weighting, 
like utility curvature, does not play any empirical role at all in explaining RP, and 
neither do other reference-independent deviations from expected utility.  Rabin 
(2000) conjectured that loss aversion, necessarily involving reference 
dependence, is the main cause: 
Indeed, what is empirically the most firmly established feature of risk 
preferences, loss aversion, is a departure from expected-utility theory that 
provides a direct explanation for modest-scale risk aversion. Loss aversion says 
that people are significantly more averse to losses relative to the status quo 
than they are attracted by gains, and more generally that people’s utilities are 
determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels. (p. 1288) 
Other authors also suggested loss aversion as an explanation (Csvd p. 307; 
Lindsay 2013; Park 2016; Wakker 2010 p. 244), but no analysis to date 
formalized or tested this conjecture.
3
  We do so by incorporating reference 
dependence in our theoretical model and by empirical tests.
4
  Thus we can settle 
                                               
2 References include Barseghyan et al. (2013), Csvd (their §4.1), Neilson (2001), and 
Wakker (2010 p. 244 5th paragraph). 
3 Many papers formalized reference dependence in other contexts, e.g. in auction theory 
(using utility of income), WTP/WTA discrepancies, narrow versus broad bracketing, and 
numerous other topics.  Lindsay (2013) shows that preference reversals for risk then 
always occur.  We will not survey this literature. 
4 Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2011) argue that reference dependence is intractable in 
models of financial markets.  They show that reference-independent probability 
weighting, as studied by Neilson (2001), can theoretically accommodate RP by properly 
 5 
the case.  We thus also confirm that utility of income explains RP, in agreement 
with suggestions by Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and others.  We have thus 
demonstrated that RP shows a genuine deviation from basic classical economic 
principles, providing one of the strongest arguments for the modern behavioral 
approach to economics. 
 
2. Notation and Definitions 
 We consider only two-outcome prospects.  By 𝜶𝑝𝜷 we denote a prospect 
yielding outcome 𝜶 with probability 𝑝 and outcome 𝜷 with probability 1 − 𝑝.  
Outcomes are money amounts.  In reference-independent models, outcomes refer 
to final wealth and are denoted in bold by Greek letters or real numbers.  The 
initial wealth, which is the final wealth level when subjects enter the laboratory in 
our experiment, is denoted 0, as has been customary in classical reference-
independent models.  It is fixed throughout the analysis and experiment. 
 By ≽ we denote a preference relation over prospects.  A utility function 𝑈 
maps outcomes to the reals and is strictly increasing and continuous.  The 
expected utility (𝐸𝑈) of a prospect 𝜶𝑝𝜷 is 
 𝑝𝑈(𝜶) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝜷). (1) 
Expected utility holds if there exists a utility function 𝑈 such that preferences 
maximize EU.   
 We next define the most general theory considered in this paper, prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), and then specify other theories as special 
                                                                                                                                      
restricting the small-scale risk aversion choices and the background risks assumed.  Their 
footnote 8 points out that the empirical measurement of Neilson’s weighting function 
remains as a problem.  We will solve this problem. 
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cases.  Prospect theory assumes that for every choice situation subjects perceive a 
particular final wealth level as their reference point, which we denote 𝜃.  
Commonly, the reference point is the status quo, but it can change within the 
analysis, for instance due to different framings.  This is the crucial difference 
between the reference point and initial wealth, which is fixed throughout the 
analysis.  Under prospect theory, outcomes describe changes with respect to this 
variable reference point and are denoted by Greek letters or real numbers in 
normal typeface.  For example, outcome 𝛼𝜃 designates final wealth 𝜶 + 𝜽 with 𝜃 
the reference point and 𝛼 the change.  The two different notations (bold and 
nonbold) for different kinds of outcomes serve to clarify the ambiguities that can 
arise but should be avoided in RP. 
 A weighting function 𝑤 maps the probability interval [0,1] to [0,1] with 
𝑤(0) = 0, 𝑤(1) = 1, and 𝑤 strictly increasing.  It does not have to be 
continuous.  A loss aversion parameter 𝜆 is a positive number.  Prospect theory 
(PT) holds if there exists a utility function 𝑢 with 𝑢(0) = 0, two probability 
weighting functions 𝑤+ and 𝑤−, and a loss aversion parameter 𝜆 such that 
preferences maximize the prospect theory value (𝑃𝑇) of prospects: 
 𝑃𝑇(𝛼𝜃𝑝𝛽𝜃) =   
 𝑤+(𝑝)𝑢(𝛼) + (1 − 𝑤+(𝑝))𝑢(𝛽)   if  𝛼 ≥ 𝛽 ≥ 0; (2) 
 𝑤+(𝑝)𝑢(𝛼) + 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝)𝜆𝑢(𝛽)   if  𝛼 ≥ 0 ≥ 𝛽; (3) 
 𝑤−(𝑝)𝜆𝑢(𝛼) + (1 − 𝑤−(𝑝))𝜆𝑢(𝛽)   if  0 ≥ 𝛽 ≥ 𝛼. (4) 
The parameters 𝑢, 𝑤+ , 𝑤−, and 𝜆 can in principle depend on the reference point 
𝜃.  However, they will be stable under small changes of 𝜃 such as in our 
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experiment, and we therefore assume that they are independent of 𝜃.5  The loss 
aversion parameter can be incorporated into utility by writing 
 𝑈(𝛼) = 𝑢(𝛼) for 𝛼 ≥ 0 and 𝑈(𝛽) = 𝜆𝑢(𝛽) for 𝛽 ≤ 0.   (5) 
𝑈 will typically have a kink at 0.  We usually denote the reference point as a 
subscript of the preference symbol rather than of the outcomes.  If the reference 
point 𝜃 has been specified, we may therefore write 𝛼 instead of 𝛼𝜃 .  Utility of 
income is the special case where there is no probability weighting, i.e., 𝑤+(𝑝) =
𝑤−(𝑝) = 𝑝.  Thus, it generalizes expected utility by incorporating reference 
dependence, maintaining expected utility given a fixed reference point. 
 We now turn to reference independent special cases of PT. The first special 
case we consider is rank-dependent utility (RDU).  It assumes 𝑤+(𝑝) = 1 −
𝑤−(1 − 𝑝) = 𝑤(𝑝) and 𝜆 = 1 (so that 𝑢 = 𝑈).  The main restriction is that, 
following EU, RDU assumes reference independence: outcomes are described in 
terms of final wealth.  This can be formalized by assuming that the reference 
point 𝜃 is fixed at 0.6  We get 
 𝑅𝐷𝑈(𝜶𝑝𝜷) =   
 𝑤(𝑝)𝑈(𝜶) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑈(𝜷)   if  𝜶 ≥ 𝜷. (6) 
                                               
5 Kahneman and Tversky (1979 pp. 277-278) wrote “However, the preference order of 
prospects is not greatly altered by small or even moderate variations in asset position. … 
Consequently, the representation of value as a function in one argument generally 
provides a satisfactory approximation.” 
6 Alternatively, it can be formalized by assuming that preferences and, accordingly, the 
components of the preference functional depend on outcomes 𝛼𝜃 only through the final 
wealth 𝛼 + 𝜃.  Yet another way to interpret RDU as a special case of PT is to assume 
𝜃 = −∞, in other words, that all outcomes are gains. 
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Probability weighting under RDU is sign-independent.  For gains we have 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑤+(𝑝) but for losses we have a dual 𝑤(𝑝) = 1 − 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝).  𝐸𝑈 is the 
special case where 𝑤+(𝑝) = 𝑤−(𝑝) = 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝.  Then the weighting functions 
are identical to their duals. 
 For two-outcome prospects as used in our experiment, nearly all existing 
reference- and sign-independent nonexpected utility theories are special cases of 
RDU and, consequently, of PT (Wakker 2010 §7.11).  Such theories include the 
reference-independent version of original prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), the second-most cited paper in economics (Coupé 2003), and 
disappointment aversion theory (Gul 1991).  Hence, the analysis of this paper 
covers all risk theories that are popular today.   
 
3. The Preferences in Rabin’s Paradox: Reference-
Dependent versus Reference-Independent Modeling 
 Although the formalization of reference-dependence defined in the 
preceding section has been used in many contexts, it has not yet been used to 
analyze RP, probably because of the controversial discussions of this paradox.  
This section shows how, using this formalization, we can identify and isolate 
potential causes of the paradox.  Figure 1 displays the choices in RP. 
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 Rabin assumed that people reject a 50-50 prospect of winning 11 or losing 
10 (Fig. 1a: basic (final-wealth) preference).  With the natural status quo of 0, 
this assumption is empirically plausible for different subjects at different wealth 
levels; that is, in a “between”-subject sense.  It then is also plausible in a 
“within”-subject sense, i.e., for one subject at different wealth levels.  For 
instance, if for a given subject in our experiment, the basic preference holds for 
most subjects €11 richer than her, then it is likely to also hold for this subject if 
she were €11 richer.  We call this argument the between-within argument.  This 
way, Rabin's claims can be confirmed without implementing, experimentally 
FIG. 1b.  Wealth-
change preferences 
FIG. 1a. Basic 
(final-wealth) 
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FIG. 1d1.  Reference-
change preferences 
FIG. 1d2. Outcome-
change preferences 
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. 50 11 11 + 𝜔 
Preferences 
in Figs. 1a 
& 1b violate 
expected 
utility 
. 50 . 50 11 
. 50 . 50 
≼ 
𝟏𝟏 𝝎 + . 50 
𝟏𝟎 𝝎 − 
0 
𝟏𝟏 . 50 
≼ 𝝎 𝟎 
−𝟏𝟎 
FIGURE 1.  The preferences in Rabin’s paradox 
≼𝜔 
R
eferen
ce-in
d
e-
p
en
d
en
t m
o
d
els 
𝜔 ≼0 
      : chance nodes—e.g., Fig. 1a displays a preference 110.5(10)  0.   
𝟏𝟏, −𝟏𝟎,𝟎,𝝎: final wealth. 
11, −10, 0,𝜔: changes with respect to reference points. 
 ≼𝜔: 𝜔 is reference point 
≼0 0 
R
eferen
ce-d
e
p
en
-
d
en
t m
o
d
els 
. 50 
−10 
. 50 
−10 10 − 𝜔 
. 50 
Figs 1b, 1d1, & 1d2 are 
not distinguished under 
reference independent 
theories. 
Figs 1a & 1c are 
not distinguished 
under reference in-
dependent theories. 
 10 
problematic, large wealth changes.  Under expected utility, the argument implies 
the wealth-change preferences in Fig. 1b for a range of wealth levels 𝝎.  Csvd’s 
experiment covered the range 𝛚 ∈ [−𝟏𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎]. 
 Figs 1a and 1b, above the dashed fat line, contain reference-independent 
presentations.  Reference-dependent presentations are below the dashed fat line, 
in Figs. 1c, 1d1, and 1d2, with reference points specified as subscripts of 
preferences.  Fig. 1c presents the basic reference-dependent preference, with 
reference point 0.  The reference-change preference of Fig. 1d1 is then plausible 
for the various reference points 𝜔 concerned, say 𝜔 ∈ [−100, 100000].  We will 
discuss later whether the outcome-change preference (Fig. 1d2) is plausible. 
 EU, as all other reference independent theories, does not distinguish 
reference-change preference from outcome-change preference (Figs. 1d1 & 1d2), 
equating them also with the wealth-change preference in Fig. 1b.  This is 
indicated by the brace in the figure below these three figures.  It explains EU’s 
“between-within” move from the basic preference to the wealth-change 
preference. Such a move, via the equivalence between Fig. 1d1 and Fig. 1d2, 
leads to highly risk averse preferences that cannot be accommodated by EU.  
 Theoretically, many explanations of the RP have been considered.  Under 
theories that maintain reference independence, one potential cause is that not only 
utility curvature but also probability weighting contributes to risk aversion (for 
instance under RDU).  Under other theories, such as prospect theory, reference 
dependence is a potential cause.  Then people treat reference-change preferences 
and outcome-change preferences differently.  Then the move from Fig. 1d1 to 
Fig. 1d2 no longer holds, and therefore preferences observed in Fig. 1a do not 
necessarily hold in Fig. 1b. 
 To identify the true cause of RP, it is crucial to model the wealth-change 
preference (Fig. 1d1) and the reference-change preference (Fig. 1d2) separately, 
and draw inference by comparing the degree of risk aversion in these two 
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decision situations. For example, if the risk aversion of Fig. 1a mostly shows up 
in Fig.1d1 and much less so in Fig. 1d2, then reference dependence and loss 
aversion are the main causes of RP.  If it is the other way around, then reference-
independent deviations from expected utility, primarily probability weighting—
and possibly also utility curvature
7—are the main causes.  If there is no 
significant risk aversion in Fig. 1d2, then probability weighting and other 
reference-independent causes play no serious role.  In that case, utility of income 
suffices to explain RP.  As emphasized by Buchak (2014 footnote 6), even though 
Rabin (2000) did not formally distinguish Figs. 1d1 and 1d2, he was careful to 
always choose framings fitting with Fig. 1d1 and never with Fig. 1d2. 
 We used a brace below Figs 1a and 1c to indicate that reference-independent 
theories do not distinguish between these two figures, similarly as they do not 
distinguish between Figs 1b, 1d1, and 1d2.  In particular, background risks play 
no role if they are incorporated into the reference point 𝜔 as in Fig. 1d1 rather 
than in outcomes as in Fig. 1d2.  The impossibility to distinguish between figures 
above one brace has hampered the debates in the literature using reference-
independent theories. 
 
4. Rabin’s Paradox as a Violation of Expected Utility 
 Because framing is central to the resolution of RP, we discuss the different 
frames that constitute our experimental stimuli jointly with our theoretical 
analyses.  The stimuli were devised based on our theoretical predictions, which is 
why we present the stimuli and predictions successively. 
                                               
7 We already know from Rabin’s (2000) analysis that utility curvature cannot explain 
much here and we ignore it in most of our discussions. 
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 We use the framing in Figure 2 to test Rabin’s basic preference (Figs 1a and 
1c).  We use an accept-reject (“Yes-No” in the stimuli) formulation because this 
leads to most reference dependence and loss aversion (Ert and Erev 2013), and 
gives the strongest possible test of classical theories.  Our prediction, in 
agreement with common views on risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
and Csvd’s findings, is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREDICTION 1.  A strong majority will reject (choose “no”) in Figure 2. 
 
IMPLICATION.  Expected utility with concave utility is falsified. 
 
EXPLANATION.  As explained in §II, if the prediction holds true, then the 
preferences in Fig. 1d1 are also plausible and, hence, the preferences in Fig. 1b 
follow under expected utility.  They imply 𝑈(𝝎 + 𝟏𝟏) − 𝑈(𝝎) ≤ 𝑈(𝝎) −
𝑈(𝝎 − 𝟏𝟎).  Hence the average marginal utility 𝑈′ over [𝝎, 𝝎 + 𝟏𝟏] is at most 
10/11 times that over [𝝎 − 𝟏𝟎, 𝝎].  For concave utility, it implies that 𝑈′ falls by 
a factor of at least 10/11 over every interval [𝝎 − 𝟏𝟎, 𝝎 + 𝟏𝟏] of length 21.  This 
is too fast to be reasonable.  For example, for every 𝛼, no matter how big, it 
FIGURE 2.  Presentation of basic preference (Fig. 1a) to subjects 
51 - 100 1 - 50 
Yes, I do. 
Would you play the following prospect? 
 €10 €11 
No, I don’t. 
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would imply rejection of the prospect 𝜶0.5(−𝟏𝟎𝟎) if the wealth-change 
preferences (Fig. 1b) hold for all 𝝎 ∈ [−𝟏𝟎𝟎, 𝜶] (Rabin 2000 p. 1282).  This is 
absurd.  It therefore entails a violation of expected utility.  Factors other than 
utility curvature are needed to explain the rejection in Figure 2.   
 
5. Nonexpected Utility Theories as Failed Attempts 
to Preserve Reference Independence 
 The main attempt to save reference independence from RP came from 
explanations based on probability weighting, the other component in prospect 
theory to deviate from expected utility.  That is, RDU was used to explain RP.  
RDU, like EU, does not distinguish between reference-change (Fig. 1d1) and 
outcome-change (Fig. 1d2) preference.  Consequently, the basic preference (Fig. 
1a) implies the wealth-change preferences (Fig. 1b) as it does under EU.  
Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006), Barseghyan et al. (2013), Csvd (their §4.1), 
Neilson (2001), and Wakker (2010 p. 244 5
th
 paragraph) pointed out that RDU 
can—in theory—accommodate the final-wealth preferences (Figs. 1a & 1b).8  For 
example, a moderate underweighting of 𝑝 = 0.5, with 
 𝑤(0.5) <
10
21
= 0.476, 
suffices to accommodate these preferences even when utility is linear.  Concave 
utility reinforces the preferences.  Empirical studies have typically found an 
average of 𝑤(0.5) < 0.476 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Fox, Erner, and 
Walters 2015), supporting the theoretical explanation.  However, violations of 
RDU have been found in other decision contexts and these cast doubt on the 
                                               
8 Freeman (2015) showed that this can continue to hold if background risks are 
incorporated. 
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probability weighting explanation.  To explore it in more detail, we test RDU by 
measuring probability weighting.  This will provide conclusive evidence.
9
 
 In a theoretical contribution, Neilson (2001) suggested the following 
extension of RP that would falsify RDU.  We test this falsification empirically.  
Crucial for Rabin’s calibration in §III is that the weight of the gain 11 is the same 
as the weight of the loss −𝟏𝟎.  To achieve these equal weights under RDU, for 
each subject we measured the probability 𝑟 such that 
 𝑤(𝑟) = 0.5. (7) 
Based on existing empirical evidence (Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992; Wakker 2010 §9.5), we predict: 
 
PREDICTION 2. The average 𝑟 in Eq. 7 will exceed 0.5 considerably, entailing 
considerable risk aversion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 Even for the most extreme case in Csvd discussed in their §4 (the second Indian group), 
strong probability weighting could in theory still explain the observed risk aversion.  Our 
empirical measurements will rule out this theoretical possibility. 
FIGURE 3.  Basic preference with 𝑟 = 0.63 instead of 0.50. 
64 - 100 1 - 63 
Yes, I do. 
No, I don’t. 
Would you play the following prospect? 
 €10 €11 
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We then offered the prospect 𝟏𝟏𝑟(−𝟏𝟎) to each subject, where r was their 
individual value measured in Eq. 7.  This gives the desired equal weighting of 
outcomes under RDU.
10
  The offered prospect was more favorable than Rabin’s 
prospect if 𝑟 > 0.5, which was the typical case.  Figure 3 displays the framing 
used for a subject with 𝑟 = 0.63.  The crucial point here is to use a framing that 
induces the right reference point and loss aversion.  For this purpose we again use 
the accept-reject framing.
 11
  Hence we have: 
 
PREDICTION 3.  A majority will reject (“No”) in Figure 3. 
 
IMPLICATION.  RDU is fails as an explanation of Rabin’s Paradox. 
 
EXPLANATION.  Under RDU with linear or slightly concave utility, subjects 
should accept the prospect offered, contrary to Prediction 3.  This shows that 
RDU’s correction for probability weighting does not remove all risk aversion.  
Neilson (2001) showed that utility curvature cannot explain the remaining risk 
                                               
10 The condition in Footnote 14 of Csvd is now satisfied and, according to their Corollary 
1.1, calibration implications for utility are possible. 
11 Previously, one of us missed this point when he did not distinguish between the 
reference changes used in our experiment and the outcome changes he had in mind 
(Wakker 2010 p. 245 2nd para).  Such confusions are likely to happen if authors think too 
much in terms of traditional reference independent models. 
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aversion by deriving utility calibration paradoxes for RDU.
12
  There must be 
factors beyond RDU.   
 
 On our domain of two-outcome prospects, nearly all reference-independent 
nonexpected utility theories agree with RDU (see end of §I).  Hence, none of 
those theories can explain RP either.  We therefore turn to reference-dependent 
theories in the next section, where we will also allow probability weighting to be 
different for gains and losses, which is empirically desirable.  Our experiment 
will later show that probability weighting plays no empirical role in RP. 
 To avoid misunderstanding, we clarify here that our study does not claim 
that probability weighting would be unimportant.  Many studies have 
demonstrated its importance (Barseghyan et al. 2013; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker 2010).  We claim only that probability 
weighting plays no role in RP.  To further illustrate our point, consider an 
alternative paradox, similar to RP and with similar calibration implications for 
utility.  It could be constructed if subjects had preferences 210.50 ≼ 10 at all or 
many wealth levels, while perceiving all outcomes as gains.  Then loss aversion 
could play no role and probability weighting would drive the paradox.  We will in 
fact test this preference later (Fig. 5b) and find that it may exist, but is 
considerably weaker than with Rabin’s stimuli.  Our only claim about probability 
weighting is that for the focus of this paper, RP, probability weighting plays no 
role.  This claim is not our main purpose, but only serves as an intermediate tool 
for what is our main and positive purpose: to show the importance of reference 
dependence. 
                                               
12 Our choice of 𝑟 rules out the theoretical possibility discussed in §III for the second 
Indian group in Csvd that strong probability weighting could still explain the risk 
aversion. 
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6. Reference-Dependent Theories Can Explain 
Rabin’s Paradox 
 Many studies have confirmed reference and sign dependence, entailing 
violations of RDU
13
, although there continue to be debates (Isoni, Loomes, and 
Sugden 2011; Plott and Zeiler 2005).  Sign dependence means that risk attitudes 
are different for losses than for gains.  Whereas probability weighting is mostly 
pessimistic for gains, with prevailing underweighting of the probabilities of best 
outcomes, for losses the opposite holds, with prevailing optimism and 
underweighting of the probabilities of worst outcomes.  This is called reflection 
and it falsifies RDU.  It also implies that the correction for probability weighting 
under RDU in Figure 3 is not correct.  To obtain Rabin’s calibration argument for 
utility, which involves the same decision weights for the two outcomes, we 
should, according to prospect theory, measure for each subject the probability 𝑝 
such that 
 𝑤+(𝑝) = 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝). (8) 
Details are in the Appendix.  Because RDU is a special case of prospect theory, it 
predicts 𝑝 = 𝑟.  Under RDU, Eq. 8 can be used as an alternative way to find the 
required 𝑟 (= 𝑝) of Eq. 7.  However, based on the common findings of reflection 
we predict: 
 
PREDICTION 4.  0.5 ≈ 𝑝 < 𝑟.   
 
                                               
13 See Bartling & Schmidt (2015), Brunnermeier (2004), Götte, Huffman, and Fehr 
(2004), Vieider et al. (2015), and Wakker (2010 §9.5). 
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We offered the prospect 11𝑝(−10) to subjects.  Figure 4 displays this offer for a 
subject with 𝑝 = 0.52.  It is natural to assume that the reference point is the status 
quo for this choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given Prediction 1 concerning the same choice but with probability 0.5 and given 
Prediction 4, we have: 
 
PREDICTION 5.  A strong majority, as in Figure 2 (Prediction 1), will reject (by 
selecting “No, I don’t”) in Figure 4. 
 
IMPLICATION.  Probability weighting does not contribute to the explanation of 
RP.  Because 𝑝 ≈ 0.5, probability weighting does not capture any risk aversion in 
RP.  After properly correcting for probability weighting (Figure 4) there remains 
the same unexplained risk aversion as before (Figure 2).   
 
 Under prospect theory, the above prediction gives indirect support to 
reference dependence, because it is the only explanation left for RP, given that 
utility curvature and probability weighting (and other nonexpected utilities; see 
53 - 100 1 - 52 
Would you play the following prospect? 
 €10 €11 
Yes, I do. 
No, I don’t. 
FIGURE 4.  Basic preference with 𝑝 = 0.52 instead of 0.50. 
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the end of §2) have been ruled out.  Loss aversion 𝜆 is commonly found to be 
about 2, although there is much variation (Ert and Erev 2013; Wakker 2010 §9.5).  
Loss aversion thus leads to strong risk aversion and can readily explain the 
preference in Figure 3 and the strong preferences in Figures 2 and 4 for any 
plausible probability weighting and utility curvature.  Outside of prospect theory, 
deviations from expected utility proposed in the literature usually have not 
considered sign dependence.  For our stimuli they mostly agree with RDU.  Thus, 
they concern Prediction 3 in the preceding section and were discussed there. 
 To obtain direct support for reference dependence, we tested the reference-
change and outcome-change preferences.  In Fig. 5b, the outcome-change 
preference cannot be formulated as an accept-reject decision and was formulated 
as a binary choice.  To have a clean test of reference dependence, we therefore 
also framed the reference-change question in Fig. 5a as a binary choice.  This 
change in framing will probably reduce loss aversion and, hence, risk aversion 
somewhat.  To make the framings and procedures as similar as possible, we also 
added the prior endowment of €1 in Fig. 5b, which by normative standards should 
be negligible.  Finally, we used the probabilities 𝑝 of Eq. 8 instead of 0.5 to 
neutralize probability weighting and focus on reference dependence.  By 
Prediction 4 these probabilities 𝑝 will not have a systematic effect on risk 
aversion and Figs. 5a and 5b also test Figs. 1d1 versus 1d2. 
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The two figures differ only in the way that final outcomes are split into reference 
point and change with respect to reference point.  Our analysis is based on the 
assumption that: (a) the reference point in Fig. 5a has the additional payment 
incorporated; (b) accordingly, the outcome −€10 in Fig. 5a is perceived as a loss; 
(c) in Fig. 5b, the status quo of €0 is the reference point so that no losses are 
perceived.  Our assumption is the most common one for reference points and for 
53 - 100 1 - 52 
Which prospect do you prefer? 
Prospect A 
Prospect B 
If this question is selected to be played out for real, you will get an additional payment of 
€11 in your bank account. 
1 - 100 
FIG. 5.a.  Reference-change preference 
 €10 €11 
€0 
53 - 100 1 - 52 
Which prospect do you prefer? 
€0 €21 
Prospect A 
Prospect B 
If this question is selected to be played out for real, you will get an additional payment of 
€1 in your bank account. 
1 - 100 
€10 
FIG. 5.b.  Outcome-change preference 
FIGURE 5.  A direct test of reference dependence (with 𝑝 = 0.52 instead of 0.50) 
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ways to induce them in experiments (de Martino et al. 2006; Fehr-Duda et al. 
2010; Kuhberger 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  It is crucial for the 
common incentivization of losses with prior endowments (Vieider et al. 2015), 
and for endowment effects such as underlying WTP-WTA discrepancies (Sayman 
and Öncüler 2005).  In the well-known model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), 
future expectations serve as reference points, but only if choices have been 
anticipated sufficiently far ahead in time, and not if they come as a surprise.  In 
our experiment, subjects did not know beforehand what the choices would be.  
Our assumption will, of course, not hold for all subjects, and several subjects will 
perceive various other reference points, such as the sure outcome €10 depicted in 
Fig. 5b.  It suffices that our assumption holds for most subjects. 
 In Fig. 5b, loss aversion does not play a role for most subjects and, therefore, 
risk aversion will be lower.  Yet risk aversion can still be expected because of 
probability weighting which is pessimistic for gains.
14
  Most subjects will take 
Fig. 5a as Fig. 1d1, and they will be as strongly risk averse as in the basic 
preferences in Figure 2.  Some subjects will integrate payments and take Fig. 5a 
as Fig. 1d2, which reduces risk aversion.  We summarize our claims: 
 
PREDICTION 6.  A majority of subjects will reject (choose the sure Prospect B) in 
Figs. 5a and 5b, but fewer than in Figure 2, and the fewest in Fig. 5b. 
 
IMPLICATION.  The difference in risk aversion between Figs. 5a and 5b falsifies 
reference independence.   
 
                                               
14 The probability used in Figure 5b, resulting from Eq. 8, was on average very close to 
0.5.  If the outcomes in Fig. 5b are perceived as gains, this probability will be weighted in 
a risk averse way, as our measurement of 𝑟 demonstrates. 
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7. Our Experimental Findings 
Subjects: N = 77 students (29 female; average age 22) from Erasmus University 
Rotterdam participated, in four sessions.  Most were finance bachelor students. 
Incentives: Each subject received a €10 participation fee.  In addition, we 
randomly (by bingo machine) selected two subjects in each session and for each 
played out one of their randomly selected choices for real consequences.  The 
selections were implemented in public by a volunteer.  The payoff was paid 
immediately after the experiment.  The experiment lasted about 45 minutes and 
the average payment per subject was €15.70. 
 
Procedure: The experiment was computerized.  Subjects sat in cubicles to avoid 
interactions.  They could ask questions at any time during the experiment.  
Training questions familiarized subjects with the stimuli.  Subjects could only 
start after they had correctly answered two comprehension questions. 
Stimuli: Probabilities were generated by throwing two 10-sided dice.  Details are 
in the Online Appendix
15
.  We first measured the probability 𝑟 (Eq. 7).  Then we 
asked the two accept-reject questions of Figures 2 and 3, followed by the 
measurement of 𝑝 (Eq. 8).  We finally asked the accept-reject question of Figure 
4 and the two questions of Figs. 5a and 5b, with the order of these three questions 
counterbalanced. 
 
Results: 
Statistical tests, all two-sided, confirmed our predictions. 
 
                                               
15 See http://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/rabinresolved_onl.appdix.pdf . 
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PREDICTION 1 [basic preference]: 88% rejected (“No”) the prospect in Figure 2 
(p-value < 0.001; binomial test). 
 
PREDICTION 2: [𝑟 > 0.5]: The average and median 𝑟 were 0.63 > 0.5 (p-value < 
0.001; Wilcoxon test). 
 
As a byproduct in the measurement of 𝑟, we also measured utility.  We found 
linear utility, which is plausible for the moderate amounts in our experiment.  
Thus, whereas Implication 1 shows that utility curvature cannot entirely explain 
RP, we find that it does not contribute to explaining RP at all. 
 
PREDICTION 3 [basic preference with RDU probability weighting]: 74% rejected 
the prospect in Figure 3 (p-value < 0.001; Binomial test).  This percentage is 
smaller than in Figure 2 (p-value = 0.015; McNemar test). 
 
PREDICTION 4 [0.5 ≈ 𝑝 < 𝑟]: The average 𝑝 was 0.52 and the median was 0.48.  
H0: 𝑝 = 0.5 is not rejected (p-value = 0.4; Wilcoxon test).  𝑝 < 𝑟 is confirmed (p-
value < 0.001; Wilcoxon test). 
 
When measuring 𝑝, as a byproduct we also measured loss aversion.  It was 
approximately 2 (see the Appendix), in agreement with previous findings in the 
literature and well suited to explain RP. 
 
PREDICTION 5 [basic preference with PT probability weighting]: 87% rejected the 
prospect shown in Figure 4 (p-value < 0.001; binomial test).  This was not 
significantly different from Figure 2 (p-value =1; McNemar test). 
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PREDICTION 6 [reference- versus outcome-change preference]: 78% rejected in 
Fig. 5a (p-value < 0.001; binomial test), and 62% rejected in Fig. 5b (p-value = 
0.08; binomial test).  The latter is smaller than the former (p-value = 0.04; 
McNemar test). 
 
8. Discussion of Experimental Details 
 Our experiment involved some adaptive (chained) stimuli, where answers 
given to some questions affected later stimuli, for instance regarding the 
probabilities 𝑟 and 𝑝 in Figures 3 and 4.  It was practically impossible for subjects 
to see through this procedure.  Further, even if the procedure were seen through, 
it would be practically impossible to then also see if and how manipulation could 
be beneficial.  Hence, manipulation is, in the terminology of Bardsley et al. (2010 
pp. 265, 285), only a theoretical possibility but is practically impossible. 
 Counterbalancing is commonly used to avoid order effects, but can 
complicate a design for subjects and the analyses done after, and can increase 
noise.  Hence, it is used only to avoid the major risks of order effects.  We felt 
that Figs 5a and 5b were most vulnerable here.  We therefore counterbalanced 
their presentation, combined with Figure 4.  For the other stimuli, we saw no 
concrete reason to expect biases due to order effects, and we did not involve them 
in counterbalancing.  We could also have avoided order effects by using between-
subject designs, rather than the within-subject design as used.  The pros and cons 
of these two designs have often been debated Camerer (1989 p. 85), where a 
between-subject design avoids order effects but a within-subject design gives 
more statistical power and can test more hypotheses.  In our case, there were 
many practical difficulties for a between-subject design.  If it had been embedded 
in sessions with other experiments, then those other experiments could have 
induced spillover effects similar to the order effects to be avoided.  If we had 
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implemented a between-subject design in isolation in, then, necessarily short 
experiments, the payoff per subject’s time unit would have exceeded the upper 
bound imposed in our labs to avoid negative externalities for other experiments. 
 
9. Preceding Literature 
 Markowitz (1952) was among the first to propose reference dependence.  
Other early works include Shackle (1949 Ch. 2 on sign-dependence) and Edwards 
(1954 p. 395 & p. 405).  Edwards later influenced the young Tversky.  Arrow 
(1951 p. 432) discussed reference dependence, pointing out that it plays no role 
when outcomes refer to final wealth, and criticizing it for this reason.  An early 
appearance of loss aversion is in Robertson (1915 p. 135).  Markowitz did not 
incorporate probability weighting and made empirically invalid conjectures about 
utility curvature.  Prospect theory corrected these points and was the first 
reference-dependent theory that could work empirically. 
 Wakker (2010 pp. 244-245) surveyed early discussions of RP.  Since then, 
Johansson-Stenman (2010) presented a theoretical analysis of RP for life-time 
consumption, Barseghyan et al. (2013 pp. 2526-2527) discussed an explanation 
based on probability weighting, and Golman and Loewenstein (2015) suggested a 
cognitive model to explain it.  Csvd investigated RP systematically, following up 
on their theoretical analysis in Cox and Sadiraj (2006).  Csvd were the first to 
confirm RP empirically and establish it as another falsification of expected utility.  
They also provided a detailed theoretical analysis under RDU (their Eq. NL-1), 
with probability weighting as the deviation from EU.  Outcomes were taken 
reference-independent, in terms of final wealth; i.e., they were changes w.r.t. the 
wealth level upon entering the lab.  Csvd pointed out that RDU is a special case 
of prospect theory (fixed reference point; sign-independent probability 
weighting), so that this special case of PT is also covered by their analysis. 
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 Csvd provided theorems that exactly identify the utility functions and 
probability weighting functions that lead to Rabin’s calibration paradoxes under 
RDU for various potential empirical preferences.  They thus showed exactly what 
more is needed to analyze the role of probability weighting in future studies.  We 
followed up on their results.  In particular, we measured and corrected for 
probability weighting in RDU to find out to what extent it accommodates RP 
empirically. 
 In their experiments, Csvd used large outcomes, incentivized through an 
arrangement with a casino with small but positive probabilities of actual 
implementation.  For 41 German students they found majority preferences 
 (𝝎 + 𝟏𝟏𝟎)0.5(𝝎 − 𝟏𝟎𝟎) ≼ 𝝎 
for 𝝎 = 𝟑𝑲, 𝟗𝑲, 𝟓𝟎𝑲, 𝟕𝟎𝑲, 𝟗𝟎𝑲, and 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝑲 with 𝐾 = 1000 and Euro as unit.  
For 30 Indian students they found majority preferences 
 (𝝎 + 𝟑𝟎)0.5(𝝎 − 𝟐𝟎) ≼ 𝝎 
for 𝝎 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝑲, 𝟐𝑲, 𝟒𝑲, 𝟓𝑲, and 𝟔𝑲 with rupee as unit (50 rupees is a one-day 
salary for the students).  Finally, for another group of 40 Indian students they 
found majority preferences 
 (𝝎 + 𝟗𝟎)0.5(𝝎 − 𝟓𝟎) ≼ 𝝎 
for 𝝎 = 𝟓𝟎, 𝟖𝟎𝟎, 𝟏. 𝟕𝑲, 𝟐. 𝟕𝑲, 𝟑. 𝟖𝑲, and 𝟓𝑲.  Thus they overwhelmingly 
confirmed preferences as in Fig. 1d2 for a wide enough range of wealth levels to 
imply RP for expected utility and thus establish it as a genuine empirical 
violation. 
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 The implications of Csvd’s findings for probability weighting are not 
entirely clear.  Their Corollary 1.1
16
 shows that RDU with nonlinear probability 
weighting and linear utility can accommodate their findings, and does not lead to 
calibration paradoxes, if 𝑤(0.5) ≤ 10/21 for the German students, 𝑤(0.5) ≤
2/5 for the first group of Indian students, and  𝑤(0.5) ≤ 5/14 for the second 
group of Indian students.  To avoid misunderstandings, note that these upper 
bounds on 𝑤(0.5) can be somewhat relaxed under concave utility, offering extra 
protection against probability calibration paradoxes.  Thus, theories that 
transform both probabilities and outcomes are less prone to calibration problems 
than theories that transform only one of these two. 
  Probability weighting is least plausible for the second Indian group of Csvd 
(requiring 𝑤(0.5) ≤ 5/14).  However, it cannot be ruled out without further 
information about this particular group of subjects, and actual measurement of 𝑤 
is desirable to settle the case.  This is why we measured and fully corrected for 
probability weighting in our experiment. 
 Csvd did not formalize or test reference dependence with loss aversion, but 
suggested it as an explanation of the problems of probability weighting.
17
  Our 
study followed up on this suggestion both theoretically and empirically.  
Reference dependence and loss aversion indeed occur for subjects who perceive 
the sure outcome 𝜔 in Fig. 1b as their reference point—i.e., who perceive the 
corresponding choice situation as in Fig. 1d1.  Then Eq. 3 with loss aversion 
𝜆 ≥ 1.8 can accommodate all aforementioned findings of Csvd even with linear 
                                               
16 Footnote 14 in the proof in their paper points out that, to obtain calibration paradoxes, 
the weighting-corrected expected value (expected value after replacing 𝑝 = 0.5 by 
𝑝 = 𝑤(0.5)) of the risky option should exceed that of the safe option. 
17 Their §4.2 excludes variable reference points for their dual paradox, but we focus on 
Rabin’s original paradox. 
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utility and linear probability weighting.  Such loss aversion is plausible.  Under 
pessimistic probability weighting and concave utility, the lower bound for 𝜆 can 
be relaxed somewhat.  There is empirical evidence that the aforementioned 𝝎 is a 
plausible reference point for many subjects (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985; 
Morrison 2000; Robinson et al. 2001; van Osch and Stiggelbout 2008). 
 Interestingly, Csvd also tested a dual version of RP, introduced by Sadiraj 
(2014), in which calibration paradoxes are the result of probability weighting 
rather than of utility.
18
  The dual paradox demonstrates once more that probability 
weighting alone cannot explain all findings.  Many other findings further 
demonstrated the importance of reference- and sign dependence, factors beyond 
probability weighting.  We will not review that literature here and we similarly 
did not investigate the dual paradox of Csvd, but focused on Rabin’s original 
paradox and its causes. 
 Summarizing, Csvd were the first to conclusively demonstrate that RP 
falsifies expected utility.  They suggested that probability weighting and 
reference dependence may accommodate these violations, but the evidence 
provided was not conclusive.  They strongly suggested that probability weighting 
alone cannot tell the whole story.  In their introduction, they raised the general 
                                               
18
 As pointed out by Csvd (§4.2), changing reference points play no role for this dual 
paradox, unlike for the original one.  But sign-dependence and loss aversion still do.  
Csvd’s Corollary 2.1 shows that, for linear utility and probability weighting, calibration 
paradoxes can be avoided if 𝜆 ≥ 3 for German students, 𝜆 ≥ 3 for one American sample, 
𝜆 ≥ 14/4 for another American sample, and 𝜆 ≥ 5 for an Indian sample.  (In their 
Corollary 2.2, Csvd do not formalize loss aversion separately but let it be part of their loss 
utility function 𝜇.  That is, their 𝜇 is our 𝑈 of Eq. 5.)  Under pessimistic probability 
weighting and concave utility, the upper bounds on 𝜆 can be relaxed.  Here, again, 
theories that transform both probabilities and outcomes are more immune to calibration 
problems than theories that transform only one of these. 
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question: “Is there a plausible theory for decision under risk?”  As we have 
shown, the main message from RP is that reference dependence is an important 
part of the answer to this general question.  As regards normative implications, 
there is wide, though not universal, agreement that reference dependence—taken 
as a framing effect—is irrational, and that it is more irrational than probability 
weighting.  Probability weighting only violates the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
independence axiom as in Allais’ paradox.  Such violations are considered to be 
rational by Machina (1982) and many others.  Hence, RP provides a more serious 
deviation from classical rationality assumptions than previously thought.  This 
conclusion is supported by Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013), who found a 
negative relation between RP choices and cognitive ability.  Proper behavioral 
risk models are therefore warranted to analyze and predict the behavioral 
consequences of human risk attitudes (Dohmen et al. 2011). 
 
10. Conclusion 
 Rabin’s (2000) paradox is one of the most famous paradoxes in the modern 
economic literature.  It is commonly, although not universally, accepted as 
negative evidence against classical expected utility (Kahneman 2003 p. 164).  Its 
cause had not yet been identified, so that no positive inference had been derived 
yet.  We identify this cause and provide a positive inference: RP proves that we 
need reference dependent generalizations of classical models, and it does so more 
strongly than any other paradox did before.  Other deviations from expected 
utility do not contribute to explaining Rabin’s paradox.  This confirms that utility 
of income does explain the paradox. 
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Appendix.  Measurement of 𝒓 and 𝑷 
We derived all indifferences in our experiment from choices through bisection 
procedures (Online Appendix).  To measure the probability 𝑟 in Eq. 7 and obtain 
an estimate of utility curvature, we iteratively elicited four indifferences, 
𝑥𝑖0.5𝑔~𝑥𝑖−10.5𝐺 (𝑖 = 1, … ,4), where we chose 𝑔 = 3, 𝐺 = 16, and 𝑥0 = 25.  
Figure A.1 displays a choice used to elicit 𝑥1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the indifferences 𝑥𝑖0.5𝑔~𝑥𝑖−10.5𝐺 we obtain, by RDU, 
𝑈(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑖−1) =
(1 − 𝑤(0.5))(𝑈(𝐺) − 𝑈(𝑔))
𝑤(0.5)
 
for all 𝑖, so that the 𝑥𝑖’s are equally spaced in utility units.  We next elicited 
probabilities 𝑟𝑖 such that 
𝑥𝑖+1𝑟𝑖
𝑥𝑖−1 ~ 𝑥𝑖 
for 𝑖 = 1,2,3.  By RDU, 𝑤(𝑟𝑖) = 0.5 for all 𝑖.  Andersson et al. (2016) showed 
how crucial it is to control implications of choice errors.  In our case, propagation 
of errors in the 𝑥𝑖’s plays no role here because all that matters is that 𝑥𝑖+1 is 
properly placed relative to 𝑥𝑖−1 and 𝑥𝑖.  The three average values of 𝑟 are 0.67, 
51 - 100 1 - 50 
€16 €25 
51 - 100 1 - 50 
€3 €57 
FIGURE A.1.  A choice to elicit 𝑥1 
Which prospect do you prefer? 
Prospect A 
Prospect B 
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0.58, and 0.63.  By a Friedman test their differences are significant (p-value = 
0.045), which can be taken as a rejection of RDU.  For 𝑟 we took the average of 
these three 𝑟𝑖. 
 To measure 𝑝 of Eq. 8, and obtain an estimate of loss aversion, we first 
chose a value 𝐿 = −10.  We then measured the bold variables in the following 
four indifferences 
 𝑮0.5𝐿 ~ 0,  𝒙
+ ~ 𝐺0.50, 00.5𝐿 ~ 𝒙
−, and 𝑥+𝒑𝑥
− ~ 0. 
Substituting PT, the indifferences imply 𝑃𝑇(𝐺0.50) =  −𝑃𝑇(00.5𝐿), 𝑈(𝑥
+) =
−𝑈(𝑥−), and, finally, the required Eq. 8 for 𝑝.  Table A.1 displays summary 
statistics. 
 
TABLE A.1: summary statistics of the 𝑥𝑖s and the probabilities 𝑟 and 𝑝 
𝑥𝑖’s probabilities 
 𝑥0 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥+ 𝑥− 𝑟 𝑝 
Mean 25 59.64 91 125.69 156.3 8.69 −3.69 0.63 0.52 
Median 25 58 91 120 151 07 −4 0.63 0.48 
Min  25 26 27 28 29 01 −6 0.05 0.05 
Max 25 88 151 214 277 31    0 0.95 0.95 
 
The values of 𝑥𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … ,4) suggest almost linear utility for gains: the distance 
𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, … ,3) are not significantly different (Friedman test, p = 0.38). 
Under the plausible assumption of piecewise linear utility for small stakes with 
only a kink at 0 reflecting loss aversion, the ratio of mean values 
𝑥+
𝑥−
= 2.36 and 
the ratio of median values  
𝑥+
𝑥−
= 1.75 suggest a loss aversion 𝜆 of approximately 
2, further supporting the presence of loss aversion. 
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